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In this paper the strategy for the eliminative reduction of the alethic modalities suggested by John
Venn is outlined and it is shown to anticipate certain related contemporary empiricistic and nomina-
listic projects. Venn attempted to reduce the alethic modalities to probabilities, and thus suggested a
promising solution to the nagging issue of the inclusion of modal statements in empiricistic philoso-
phical systems. However, despite the promise that this suggestion held for laying the ‘ghost of mod-
ality’ to rest, this general approach, tempered modal eliminativism, is shown to be inadequate for that
task.
1. Tempered modal eliminativism
Many philosophers and logicians have suggested that there is a close tie between
the concepts of possibility and of probability. It is also true that many philosophers
have regarded the modalities with deep suspicion, especially in the context of the
sciences.1 Van Fraassen comments that,
in the Aristotelian tradition, natural philosophy was deeply involved with modal-
ity: necessity, possibility, contingency, potentiality. Nominalism and modern em-
piricism rejected this role of modality, arguing that necessity, for example, attaches
only to the relations among ideas, or among words, and not to physical occur-
rences. But, empiricism has not been lucky with modality; as Herman Weyl said,
the ghost of modality is not easily laid. In this century the problem has become
much more acute, for a new modality, a possibility-with-degrees, has taken center
stage in physical science: probability. (1980, p. 158.)
However, the ‘ghost of modality’ that nominalists and empiricists find to be so
offensive has long been supported by philosophers with rationalist proclivities. In
particular, Leibniz was a staunch defender of the legitimacy both of the concept
of possibility and of the concept of probability. More interestingly, Leibniz
argues that probability is just degree of possibility (i.e. probability can be
reduced to degrees of possibility),2 and this Leibnizian view will be referred to
here as probabilistic eliminativism.3 Following Leibniz, one might want to claim
that probability is just graded modality, and I presume that the empiricists to
1 Quine’s well-known views are a good example of this kind of skepticism with respect to the modalities. See Quine
(1960, ch. 3, 1947, 1953) for details.
2 See Beirmann and Faak 1957, Hacking 1971 and Hacking (1975, chs. 13–14).
3 This view constitutes a reductive elimination of probability, and depends on there being an isomorphism between the
structure of probabilities (the algebra of probabilities) and the structure of possibilities (the algebra of possibilities),
but the mapping from the elements of the algebra of probabilities to the elements of the algebra of possibilities is not
a one-to-one mapping. As a result, the algebras are not isomorphic, and, hence, probabilities cannot be reduced to
possibilities without loss of meaning.
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which van Fraassen refers would just as well get rid of both concepts if this
turns out to be the case as they would then, presumably, both be equally
offensive.
However, this radical eliminativist view, extreme modal eliminativism, seems as if it
may be rather too extreme even for nominalistic empiricists, especially when one notes
the importance of the concept of probability in the contexts of the physical sciences,
confirmation theory, decision theory, game theory, as well as a whole host of other
important related fields.4 Certainly one need not treat probabilities and the traditional
modalities in the same manner, and, as Niiniluoto notes in his discussing traditional
views of modality and probability,
. . . the classical theory also suggests that probability theory is in fact reducible to
the theory of modality: if the concepts of necessity, possibility, and equipossibility
are given, then a mathematical notion of probability is understood as well.
(1988a, p. 279.)
A modern, more sophisticated, version of this modality friendly project can be
found in Bigelow 1976. In the Leibnizian tradition, Bigelow attempts to provide
what, in modern parlance, we might refer to as a possible worlds account of
probability, and this is most certainly a modality based account of probability.
Bigelow claims that,
Given a numerical measure of the similarities between pairs of worlds, there
will be various derivative numerical measures which can be assigned to sets
of possible worlds, or propositions. It is possible that some of these numer-
ical measures on propositions might be related to their probabilities. (1976,
p. 305.)
He also adds that,
. . . a measure of the diameter of a proposition gives some indication of the range of
possibilities which it encompasses, or the variety of ways in which it can come to be
true. We might naturally conjecture that a proposition which is true in widely dis-
similar worlds will, in general, be more probable than one in which is true only in
more a restricted range of very similar worlds. Consequently, the notion of the dia-
meters of propositions seems to be related to the notion of probability. (1976,
p. 305.)
Similarly, in discussing the merit of regarding modalities as dyadic operators, von
Wright has suggested that,
Of old, probability and possibility had been regarded as related ideas. What is the
probability of a proposition, on given evidence, but the degree to which this pro-
position, on the evidence is possible? This being so it was tempting to look for a
formal similarity of structure also between modal logic and probability theory.
4 The sense in which this program is an eliminative program, is in the sense of elimination via reduction. Probability
claims are, in the Leibnizian view, completely eliminable slava veritate and without loss of meaning by systematically
replacing them with the more fundamental modal claims in terms of which they are defined.
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Whatever the correct solution in this matter may be, it is possible to construct a
formal dyadic modal logic which has the following interesting properties:
1. Monadic modal logic of the traditional type can be viewed as a limiting (or ‘de-
generate’) case of dyadic logic, viz., as a logic of possibility relative to tautologous
evidence.
2. Dyadic modal logic can be given an axiomatic presentation which is strikingly
similar to an axiomatic presentation of the probability calculus.
The logic of probability can thus be viewed as a numerical modal logic. (1989,
pp. 31–2.)
In this passage not only does von Wright indicate both the striking structural
similarities between the alethic modalities and the probability calculus and the prima
facie plausibility of regarding the probability calculus as a more precise modal logic,
but also, he raises the controversial issue whether one might regard the alethic
modalities as conditional concepts where the modalities in question are conditional on
tautologous evidence. Ignoring the specific details of Bigelow’s and von Wright’s
accounts, we can simply note that, in accord with the Leibnizian doctrine mentioned
above, it is not completely implausible that probabilities might be related to the
modalities, or to some properties associated with modal concepts (e.g. Bigelow’s
diameters).5
However, neither this kind of project nor extreme modal eliminativism would be
acceptable to those nominalistic empiricists who harbor a general skepticism with
respect to the modalities, but have no such prejudice with respect to probabilities for
the reasons mentioned above. As a result, one might wonder about the acceptability of
less extreme forms of modal eliminativism. In accord with this sort of general
intuition, Niiniluoto also notes that,
Another, more promising alternative would be to reduce modality to probability. If
we could analyse the truth conditions for probability statements without employ-
ing modal concepts, then necessity could be defined by probability one, impossibil-
ity by probability zero, and possibility by non-zero probability. (1988a, p. 279.)
The empiricist inspired elimination of the traditional modalities mentioned by van
Fraassen, and championed by Quine, might then be achieved by reducing the
modalities to probabilities via definition. This eliminativist project, tempered modal
eliminativism, might then initially appear to be a satisfactory tack for the modal
eliminativist to take, and it would both maintain the status of the probability calculus
as well as explain the prevalence of modal discourse as parasitic on the prevalence of
probabilistic discourse.6
Historically, the project of reducing the traditional modalities to probabilities was
vigorously pursued by the logician John Venn in The Logic of Chance, (1866, ch. XII),
5 Now, Bigelow is clear that we cannot tell what the probability of a proposition is from the diameter of a proposition
alone. Rather, he identifies them with a different technical concept associated with possible worlds; viz. volumes. See
Bigelow (1976, pp. 305–8) for more details. See Nilsson 1986 for a variant of this strategy.
6 This might straightforwardly seem to be the case as standard alethic modal operators are non-epistemic unary
operators whereas probabilities are epistemic operators that are often conditional and dyadic, and this might indicate
that probability is really an epistemic concept that depends on one’s evidence and so is not a modality in the normal
sense associated with the alethic modalities.
307Probability and tempered modal eliminativism
and as we have seen this view of the modalities has some intuitive appeal, particularly
for empiricists.7 With this idea in mind, Venn argued that none of the traditional
divisions of the modalities in terms of their strength is as precise as the probability
calculus, which admits of continuous numerical degrees,8 and that,
. . . the logicians, after having had a long and fair trial, have totally failed to make
anything satisfactory out of this subject of the modals by their methods of enquiry
and treatment; and that it ought, therefore, to be banished entirely from that
science, and relegated to probability. (1866, p. 299.)
So, it seems that the modalities might just be coarse-grained probabilities, which
can be more precisely expressed without any loss of meaning in terms of numerical
probabilities. With respect to possibility, for example, this intuition seems prima
facie plausible as the possible truth of p seems to be something rather like the
probable truth of p, and the probable truth of p can be given a precise numerical
value in the continuous interval [0, 1]. Specifically, possibility would be identified
with the half-open, half-closed, interval [0, 1]. Similarly, impossibility would be
identified with 0 probability, necessity with probability 1, etc. In honor of Venn’s
seminal contribution on the issue, I will refer to this particular project as the Venn
project, and it requires that all modal concepts can be eliminated and replaced by
probability statements. As such, the Venn project is a form of tempered modal
eliminativism.9 The sections that follow will specifically concern the concept of
7 For historical details see Niiniluoto 1988a, Niiniluoto 1988b and Venn 1866.
8 See, especially, Venn (1866, ch. XII, § 20). Venn discusses several early attempts to rank modal concepts from the
weakest to strongest, and he argues that such attempts were primitive or coarse modal attempts to do the work of the
concept of probability in discrete terms. But, Venn superficially refers to the modalities in terms of degrees of
certainty, and, as a result, one might be tempted to regard his project as only aimed at eliminating the epistemic
modalities. However, it is clear that elimination of the modalities is intended to extend to the logical modalities and
not just to epistemic modalities. Venn is clearly ambiguous about the nature of the modalities themselves as well as
about the nature of logic, but in general his view of logic is very similar to Boole’s view of logic as the laws of though
(see Boole 1854, Hailperin 1986, 1996). Now, again, this might tempt one to interpret Venn’s view of the modalities as
epistemic as Niiniluoto (1988b) does, but this is a rather uncharitable interpretation of Venn’s work on logic. His
work, by and large, predates the Fregean criticisms of psychologistic interpretations of logic, and so we can
reasonably construe his view as the view that even the logical modalities are reducible to the probability calculus.
This claim is least modestly supported in virtue of the fact that he is fully aware of the concept of mathematical
certainty (see Venn 1866, p. 317) which appears to be an important precursor element of the logicistic interpretation
of logic.
9 For formal reasons one might immediately regard this intuition regarding the structural similarity between
possibilities and probabilities as flawed. If reduction requires isomorphism, then there must be a one-to-one mapping
from the algebra of possibilities to the algebra of probabilities. But, isomorphisms are symmetric only if there is a
one-to-one mapping between them (i.e. they are structural equivalencies and require that the mapping F: A ? B
matches unique elements in A, x 2 A, with unique elements in B, y 2 B, and that the inverse map F7 1 maps unique
elements of B into unique elements of A). As noted in note 3, there is no such mapping from the algebra of
probabilities to the algebra of possibilities. Consequently, there can be no isomorphism between possibilities and
probabilities. So, the Venn project can only be achieved if reduction does not require strict isomorphism, but rather
some weaker relation like homomorphism, embedding or mere similarity. However, homomorphism, embedding and
mere similarity are relations that are too weak to allow for eliminative reduction via definition. Homomorphisms are
not symmetric, and, hence, although it is true that the algebra of possibilities is not homomorphic to the algebra of
probabilities, it is true that the algebra of probabilities is homomorphic to the algebra of possibilities. This is
interesting, because even if we relaxed the requirement for reduction from isomorphism to homomorphism, it would
imply that modal eliminativism is false while leaving open the possibility of probabilistic eliminativism. But, this is no
help to the nominalists and empiricists who want to eliminate the traditional modalities while retaining the concept of
probability.
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logical possibility and whether it can be reduced to non-zero probability, the results
achieved can be easily extended to necessity, equipossibility, etc.10 In any case, the
identification of possibility with non-zero probability, and the subsequent
elimination of possibility, will hold only if for any proposition p, possibly p
entails that p has a non-zero probability; formally, if (Vp)(^p?P(p) „ 0) is
true.11,12 However, given even a cursory analysis, the inference from possibly p to
probably p appears as if it might be fallacious. In ordinary modal systems, one
cannot infer an actuality from a mere possibility, and, hence, unless probabilities
are not actualities the Venn project ought to be regarded with immediate
suspicion.13 In fact, given a close analysis of Venn’s views, Venn appears to want to
eliminatively reduce the alethic modalities to empirically accessible physical
properties. In fact, Venn (1866) originates the frequency interpretation of
probability and it appears that Venn, like Reichenbach, regards probabilities as
actual physical properties of the world on a par with other, more mundane,
physical properties, and so Venn’s tempered modal eliminativism is ultimately
aimed at the implausible target of showing that modal propositions are about
actual physical objects. However, in order to buttress these vague and intuitive
objections about the inadequacy of Venn’s project, it would be desirable to provide
10 It also remains to be seen whether or not the criticisms of the Venn project presented herein can be extended to
weaker modal concepts. This question will be left open for future investigations, but if the criticisms can be extended
to weaker modalities, then there might be interesting consequences with respect to views like those espoused by D. H.
Mellor (1995, 2000). He claims, ‘The kind of necessity that ‘‘chc(E)=1’’ must express is usually if not always
contingent: it can exist in our world without existing in all other possible worlds and so cannot be metaphysical
necessity [1.6] . . . But even if the necessity that ‘‘chc(E)=1’’ expresses is weaker than metaphysical necessity, it must
still entail existence’ (Mellor 1995, p. 31). So, although Mellor is rather unclear what kind of modalities are employed
in formulating the necessity condition he uses to explain causation inMellor 1995, if the modality in question is non-
reducible to probability, then his view is in need of revision.
11 This must be the case because if :(a? b), then it is possible that (a & :b), and, in the case at hand, this would entail
that there can be logical possibilities which are not non-zero probabilities. But, the reductionistic cum eliminativist
Venn project requires that all modalities, including possibilities, must be reducible to probabilities. Modalities and
probabilities must be completely co-referential if they are identical, and so if there is some proposition that is possible
but has a zero probability, then modalities and probabilities are not co-referential. See Levi 1980 for discussion of the
incompatibility of such claims, and Zaman 1987 for an attempt to deal with the compatibility of such claims.
12 It is important to notice that the probability referred to in this expression is an unconditional probability, and one
might be tempted to claim that all probabilities are conditional probabilities. Often the conditional aspect of
probabilities is omitted in probability expressions for convenience, and so we must be clear about the conditional or
unconditional nature of probabilities. Now, we do not want to bias the issue either way, and we will attempt to be
clear when considering the various interpretations of the probability calculus. In brief, empirical versions of
objectivist interpretations hold that probabilities are not conditional on any source of information (i.e. are not
conditional in the usual sense), while both other types of interpretations generally regard probability statements as
conditional. In any case, one might be tempted to claim that it is obvious that^p is compatible with P(pje)=0, but
that ^(pje) is not obviously compatible with P(pje)=0. This suggestion brings to mind von Wright’s suggestion
noted above concerning treating all modalities as dyadic, and, more controversially, as treating the alethic modalities
as conditional on tautologous evidence (see von Wright 1989, pp. 31–32). But, Venn does not appear to be aware of
the concept of a conditional possibility, and is most concerned with the alethic modalities as opposed to, say, the
epistemic modalities (which might, more plausibly, be regarded as conditional modalities). The view that the logical
modalities can be seriously interpreted in conditional terms is unconvincing, and we will return to this topic in
sections 2.1 and 2.2. But, Venn’s project appears to be intended to eliminate logical possibility, etc., and not just
epistemic possibility.
13 See van Fraassen 1989, Lemmon 1977, Konyndyk 1986 and Ackermann 1967 for discussions of permissible modal
inferences and the problems associated with intensional logics. As Ackermann (1967, p. 17) points out, ‘it is similarly
clear that^p? p cannot also be a theorem of a modal calculus without making p and^p provably equivalent, thus
making the modal operator ^ redundant.’
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a coherent argument for the conclusion that the Venn project cannot be successfully
implemented.
2. Interpretation of the probability calculus
The probability calculus is constituted by three fundamental axiomatic claims that
can be formulated as follows:
Axiom 1. 04P(p) 4 1 for all p in sample space S.
Axiom 2. P(S)=1.
Axiom 3. If p and q are mutually exclusive events, then P(p[ q)=P(p)+P(q),
and if p,q, r, . . . is a finite or infinite sequence of mutually exclusive elements of
S, then P(p[ q[ r[ . . . )=P(p)+P(q)+P(r)+ . . .
Here we will restrict our concerns to finite probability spaces that are continuous,
although the main points made below can be extended to both the discrete and infinite
cases. Note that Axioms 1–3 can be presented without anything like an intended
interpretation, and the various interpretations of Axioms 1–3 can be viewed as
different ways of characterizing the elements of S and the nature of the probability
function or probability distribution over S. In any case, there are two general classes of
interpretations of the probability calculus: (1) subjective interpretations (SIs); and (2)
objective interpretations (OIs). The former class includes subjective Bayesianism, de
Finetti’s theory, F.P. Ramsey’s theory, L.J. Savage’s theory, etc., and the latter class
includes Popper’s propensity interpretation, Carnap’s and Keynes’ logical theories of
probability,14 frequency interpretations like those of Reichenbach and vonMises, etc.
The distinction divides the various interpretations of A1–A3 into those that claim
that probabilities are epistemic, and those which hold that probabilities are, in some
way, independent of epistemic states. Other ways of classifying interpretations of the
probability calculus are typically more fine-grained, but this broad distinction (which
appears to be exhaustive) will serve our purposes here.15 What will be argued for here
is that given any interpretation of the probability calculus, possibly p does not entail
that p has a non-zero probability, and, as a result, the Venn project is fundamentally
misguided. The main argument will have the form of an argument by cases with the
conclusion that the conjunction of possibly p and the probability of p equals zero is
consistent, or, formally, that^p & P(p)=0 can be true.16 This constitutes a counter-
example to the claim that possibly p entails that the probability of p is non-zero. If this
can be proved, then it follows that it is p the case that possibly p entails that the
probability of p is non-zero, and, consequently, that possibility cannot be reduced to
probability as the Venn project would have it. Clearly the bona fides of this argument
hangs on providing some justifications for the claims that given SI ‘possibly p’ and
14 As we shall see later, there is some question whether the logical theory of probability ought to be regarded as a
species of the subjectivist theories or as a species of the objectivist theories. Ultimately it is probably best regarded as
a species of OI.
15 For a survey of various ways of classifying interpretations of the probability calculus, and discussion of their
adequacy seeWeatherford (1982, ch. 1). In terms of Weatherford’s four fold distinction of theories of probability, OI
would include the relative frequency (RF) and a priori (AP) theories, and SI would include the classical (CTP) and
subjective (SUB) theories.
16 For the sake of simplicity assume that P(p) is definable, either as an absolute probability or as a conditional
probability, but in general any reference to evidence and background knowledge will be omitted throughout.
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‘the probability of p is zero’ can be consistent and that given OI ‘possibly p’ and ‘the
probability of p is zero’ also can be consistent.
Subjectivist interpretations17
Are there good reasons for accepting that subjectivist interpretations of the
probability calculus entail the consistency of possibly p and that the probability of p is
zero? Given subjective interpretations of the probability calculus, probabilities are
identified as degrees of belief or credal probabilities. Hence, probabilities are clearly
epistemological. So, subjective probabilities are typically regarded as confidence levels
with respect to the proposition in question relative to some source of background
information. As such, the subjectivist typically regards all probabilities as conditional
probabilities, conditional on one’s background beliefs. One’s totality of probability
assignments over one’s set of beliefs is the probability function that one adopts, and
typical subjectivists argue that there is no objectively correct probability function, or
probability distribution, that should be adopted. Importantly, many (if not most)
subjectivists reject limiting acceptable probability distributions to regular distribu-
tions; i.e. those that are strictly coherent.
Strict coherence amounts to the claim thatP(p)=0 if and only if p is logically false.
In other words, a distribution is strictly coherent if P(p)=0 if and only if p is logically
impossible. Insofar as subjectivists only require that probability distributions be
coherent and not strictly coherent, on this type of view it seems obviously consistent
that a proposition may be logically possible while that proposition has a probability of
zero relative to background information. Rejecting strict coherence as a limitation on
probability distributions amounts to the claim that such situations are consistent. For
example, it appears to be consistent that some event is a logical possibility while it has a
zero probability relative to some system of background information. Some state of
affairs may not be logically false, but the evidence available to some cognizer may
prompt her to assign a zero probability to that state of affairs. So, on subjectivist
interpretations of the probability calculus it clearly seems possible that there are logical
possibilities with zero probabilities. It seems that, given SI, (^p & P(p)=0) can be
true, and this seems to be a direct result of the typical subjectivists rejection of strict
coherence. But, can one simply reject strict coherence as too strong an imposition on
admissible probability distributions without further comment? Perhaps the subjecti-
vists’ rejection of strict coherence is unwarranted. So, what are the typical justifications
for strengthening the probability calculus to make it strictly coherent? If there are no
good independent reasons to require that strict coherence ought to be adopted, then
there will be no non-question begging reasons to claim that the logical possibility of p is
incompatible with the subjective assignment of a zero probability to p.
The standard Dutch book justifications of mere coherence depend on the
concept of a fair bet, and presume, rightly, that it would be irrational for someone
to enter into a betting situation that ensured that they would suffer a loss in the
long run. The standard justification of why we ought to accept these principles of
rational behavior seem to depend on intuition and/or consider the coherence
17 I include discussion of subjective interpretations for the sake of both comprehensiveness and generality. In point of
fact, Venn himself rejected subjective interpretations of the probability calculus, like that offered by De Morgan, as is
clear from his comments (1962, pp. ix, 119n, 122–3). Nevertheless, as my aim to show the inadequacy of all forms of
tempered modal eliminativism and not just the inadequacy of the Venn project, it is necessary to address such
interpretations.
311Probability and tempered modal eliminativism
condition to be analytic.18 But, this is rather presumptuous to say the least, and
appears to beg the question, ‘Is the claim that P(p)=0 if and only if p is logically
impossible analytic in any understandable sense of the term ‘analytic’ such that it is
on a par with simple mathematical truths’? Perhaps, but intuitions may, and do,
differ concerning this issue. For example, De Finetti, Ramsey, and, recently, Levi
all urge us to reject strict coherence; i.e. to reject the claim that probability
distributions must be regular.19 Their reasons for rejecting strict coherence,
however, are not on a par with reasons that one might give for rejecting the
putatively analytic claim that ‘2 + 2 =5’, and this suggests that the criterion may
not really be an analytic claim. Their reasons for rejecting the criterion of strict
coherence are founded upon differing intuitions about what possible betting
situations ought to be characterized as rational, and it is not at all clear that
labeling the criterion ‘analytic’ provides anything like a justification of that
condition. In fact, with the advent of naturalistic theories of rationality and Quine’s
demolition of the analytic/synthetic distinction I would be inclined to believe that
principles about what constitutes rational human betting behavior are empirical
claims that are neither analytic nor knowable a priori.20 So, the consistency claim
holds with respect to subjective interpretations of the probability calculus unless
there is some non-question begging justification of strict coherence and it does not
seem to be the case that there is such a justification available for strict coherence.
Objectivist interpretations
Are there reasons for accepting the claim that objectivist interpretations of the
probability calculus entail the consistency of possibly p and that p has a probability of
zero? As suggested above justifying this claim is a bit more difficult than justifying the
same claimmodulo the interpretation as subjective, and this is, in part, due to the wide
variety of objectivist interpretations of the probability calculus. In order to simplify
the discussion the class OI needs to be partitioned into those objectivist
interpretations that are empirical interpretations, OIE, and those objectivist
interpretations that are logical interpretations, OIL. It is the latter that will pose the
most difficult problem for establishing the main argument and rejecting the Venn
project. First, however, we must consider OIE.
On typical empirical or physicalist versions of the objectivist interpretations of the
probability calculus probabilities are regarded as properties of event types or event
tokens, or, perhaps, as dispositional properties of physical objects.21 For the sake of
brevity, in what follows I will simply refer to event types, and assume that the results
can be applied mutatis mutandis to varieties of this class of theories that regard
probabilities as properties of event tokens or physical objects. Given these empirically
based theories of the probability calculus, the probability of an event type depends on
the facts of the matter at some particular world region. But, such probabilities do not
make reference to any evidence whatsoever, and, hence, in this case there is no worry
18 See Shimony (1955, pp. 129–30).
19 See De Finetti 1972, Ramsey 1926 and Levi 1978.
20 For some more or less compelling examples of such views see Kahneman et al. 1982, Cherniak 1986, Kitcher 1992,
Smokler 1990 and Stich 1990. And Quine’s classic criticism of the analytic/synthetic distinction is found in Quine
1961. For some objections to this view of the status of principles of rationality see Biro and Ludwig 1994 and Evnine
2001.
21 The latter consideration is necessary to cover Popper’s propensity interpretation of probabilities. On Popper’s theory
of probability probabilities are dispositions of physical objects.
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about whether probabilities are conditional probabilities and there is no worry about
whether or not the probability calculus should be limited by the imposition of strict
coherence. On such theories probabilities are simply objective properties of the world
just like any other physical property. If this is so, then it may be the case that some
event is logically possible while it has a zero probability in that region of that world.
For example, it may be the case that it is logically possible that electrons or the Z0, the
intermediate vector boson, can decay, but as it stands, it is an empirical fact that
neither type of particle ever decays in that region, where the region may be the totality
of the world. So, although the event type electron decay is a logical possibility in this
region (it is not a logical falsity) it may have a zero probability as determined by the
facts of our world. It is, in fact, the case that events types of these two sorts are not
permitted by the actual laws of our world, and (at least intuitively) it would seem to be
the height of irrationality to claim that such events have some non-zero probability
nonetheless. The corresponding region in some other possible world, governed by
more or less different physical laws, may be physically compatible with such event
types, but that such events are consistent with some set of counter-factual physical
laws that can be formulated (i.e. are permitted by some other set of logically consistent
laws) does not seem to indicate that the probability of such events in the actual world
is non-zero. Take the typical frequency interpretation of probabilities.22 An event
type, or a sequence of type-similar events, is probable in virtue of the fact that it
happens with some frequency or other in the limit case, i.e. some chance set-up occurs
with some frequency in the limit, and there are objective facts about the limit
frequency of these types of events just like there are facts about any other type of
physical event. So, on this interpretation of the probability calculus:
PðpjqÞ ¼ Limit
n!1 frnðpjqÞ
Where the frequency of an event is defined as:
frnðpjqÞ ¼ frnðp  qÞ
frnðqÞ
in short, the frequency of p given q is the ratio of the number of individuals or events
having both p and q divided by the number of individuals or events having q. Where q
holds for all p, the absolute probability of p is just the limit frequency of p. The sense
in which such probabilities are conditional is not intended to be conditional on any
background belief system. In any case, many more types of chance set-ups or event
types are logically possible than actually ever occur, and if this is so, then it would
seem obvious that there can be logical possibilities which have zero probabilities.
For example, the limit frequency of electron decay in the actual world is 0 relative
to electron set-ups and yet it seems manifestly clear that it is logically possible that
electron decay could occur. The general reason why this appears to be so is that on
empirical versions of the objectivist interpretation of the probability calculus, prob-
22 Interestingly, as noted in the introduction, Venn has been credited (along with Peirce) as the founder of the relative
frequency interpretation of probabilities, and this view is proposed in Venn 1866. Consequently, one might plausibly
interpret Venn’s modal eliminativism more specifically as the claim that all the modalities can be eliminatively
reduced to physical probabilities. However, this more controversial assumption is not presupposed here.
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abilities depend on the vagaries of the facts while logical possibilities are necessarily
independent of any factual, empirical, considerations. It seems to be the case by defi-
nition empirical probabilities of logically possible event types that never occur will be
0. So, it seems that OIE permits (^p & P(p)=0) to be true.
What of logical versions of the objectivist interpretation of the probability calculus
such as Carnap’s? On OIL can (^p & P(p)=0) be true? In order to answer this
question we need to examine just what the logical theory claims probabilities are, and
how the theory differs from both the empirical versions of the objectivist interpretation
of the probability calculus and from subjectivist interpretations of the probability
calculus. Carnap’s (1962) explications of the meaning of logical probability,
probability1, appear to be ambiguous between a kind of inter-subjectivism and a
kind of objectivism of the sort in which we are interested in this section.23 In the preface
to the second edition of The Logical Foundations of Probability Carnap says,
(probability1) was informally explained in § 41 in several ways: (a) as the degree to
which a hypothesis h is confirmed or supported by the evidence e; (b) as a fair bet-
ting quotient; and (c) as an estimate of relative frequency. Even at that time I re-
garded (a) as less satisfactory than (b) or (c); today I would avoid formulations of
the kind (a) because of their ambiguity (see Points B and C below). Although the
concept of logical probability in the sense here intended is a purely logical concept,
I think that the meaning of statements like ‘the probability of h with respect to e in
2/3’ can best be characterized by explaining their use, in combination with the con-
cept of utility, in the rule for the determination of rational decisions. (1962, p. xv.)
Carnap explicitly claims that (a) is ambiguous in a well-discussed sense,24 but it seems
that (a), (b) and (c) also introduce ambiguity into the concept of logical probability in
an important, but different, sense. This ambiguity centers on whether or not logical
probabilities are actually subjective or objective, and this ambiguity is revealed in
examining some of the various ways in which subsequent authors have characterized
the logical theory of probability. On the one hand, explicating logical probability as
something like (c), as an estimate of relative frequency, seems to introduce an
unacceptable element of subjectivism into the supposedly logical concept of
probability. However, ignoring (c) as too apt to be interpreted subjectively, and
focusing on explication (a) or (b) might still lead one to believe that logical
probabilities are not really objective in any real sense.
One might be tempted to regard the logical theory as a species of the objectivist
theory of probability as it was seemingly intended to be. However, given some
characterizations of logical probability, one might also be tempted to regard it as an
inter-subjectivist theory of probability.25 As such, it might seem plausible to assert
23 Hacking notes this ambiguity in Hacking (1975, p. 149), and indicates that it is often presented as a criticism of
logical theories of probability. Also, Jeffery 1975 acknowledges the ambiguous sense in which Carnap’s theory of
confirmation is meant to be logical.
24 See Carnap (1962, pp. xv–xix) for an explanation of the ambiguity associated with the (a) explication.
25 This kind of theory is explicitly defended by Donald Gillies (1991), and Gillies argues that inter-subjective
interpretations of probabilities are closely related to subjectivist interpretations of probabilities. On his view
probability distributions can be attributed to social groups in states of consensus that are informationally transparent
rather than to individuals, as in standard subjective interpretations. But, this view turns out to depend on contingent
features of such social groups, and is equally susceptible to the criticisms directed at purely subjectivist
interpretations of the probability calculus.
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that it really is just a type of subjectivist theory, especially when we recognize that the
characterization of the logical theory given above appeals to the contingent
epistemological structure of how humans think. If this is the case, however, then,
with only as little modification, the logical theory could be shown to permit
^p & P(p)=0) to be true for roughly the same reasons that SI does. Where in the
case of subjectivist theories we appealed to the variations in probability assignments
across agents in order to justify the consistency claim concerning zero probabilities
and logical possibilities, in the case of the inter-subjectivist theory we can appeal to
possible variations across kinds of cognitive agents. It seems perfectly consistent to
assert that some suitably different cognitively endowed entity assigns a zero
probability of such a thing occurring and it is obviously logically possible that such
an event obtains. The problem with the inter-subjectivist theory, as characterized by
Weatherford, is that it turns out that it does appeal to empirical matters in a more
subtle way. Specifically, the inter-subjectivist theory appeals to the de facto structure
of how we think, to our actual epistemological constitution, and it is certainly possible
that other cognitively endowed entities do not share our cognitive structure.26 So, if
the logical theory is regarded as this kind of anthropomorphic subjectivist theory,
then it permits (^p & P(p)=0) to be true.
On the other hand, if, as suggested at the outset, one jettisons the appeal to the
facts concerning how we think in characterizing the logical theory of probability, and
regard the logical theory as a species of objectivist theory, then can we show that on
OIL (^p & P(p)=0) can be true? If one can, then the main argument presented in
§2.0 will have been established as sound. So, how are we to think of probabilities in the
logical theory if they are not subjective in any sense? In a typical presentation of the
view, F.C. Benenson tells us that the logical view of probability,
. . . is the view that probability judgments are always relative to the evidence, and
in fact merely indicate the degree of certainty a particular body of evidence gives to
the hypothesis we are concerned with. (1984, pp. 13–14.)
Moreover, he adds that,
according to the theory, it is not merely such evidence [empirical evidence] which
permits us to know the truth of ordinary probability statements, but such evidence
combined with a single logical relation of partial entailment it bears to the hypoth-
esis in question, provides us with an effective method for determining the truth of
the statement on the probability of that hypothesis—we simply perform the finite
task of contemplating that evidence, and then, to determine the truth of the state-
ment, effectively compute the degree of logical probability the evidence gives the
hypothesis. (1984, p. 17.)
On this sort of interpretation, the degree of support that a body of evidence gives to an
hypothesis via their logical relation seems to be purely objective and clearly
conditional, and this characterization seems to correspond most closely to Carnap’s
26 The point here is reminiscent of the point made concerning Kant’s forms of sensible intuition as presented in The
Critique of Pure Reason. The forms of sensible intuition, space and time, are regarded as necessary for experience, but
the necessity involved here is relative and not absolute. The forms of sensible intuition may not hold objectively for
all kinds of cognitive beings.
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(a) explication of the logical concept of probability. The propositions that constitute
the body of evidence entail, or partially entail, the hypothesis, and so allow us to
attribute a probability to the hypothesis relative to the evidence in accord with the
axioms of the probability calculus. But the (a) explication is rejected by Carnap, and
he seems to favor the (b) explication, what Hilpinen has labeled the belief-explication
of logical probability.27 However, it is far from obvious that the (b) explication can be
plausibly interpreted as being objective, especially because it seems to be intimately
related to the concept of rational decision-making. If one interprets probabilities in
terms of rational (human) decision-making, then it appears as if one might again be
confronted with a subjectivist characterization of logical probability like that referred
to above, and thus the argument in §2 would turn out to be sound.
One might simply claim, however, that Carnap’s fair betting quotients make no
appeal to subjective states at all. Rather, probabilities might be interpreted objectively
as being defined in terms of fair betting quotients; i.e. as being an objective fragment of
logic ormathematics. The variousDutch book theorems aim to show that following the
axioms of the probability calculus define the concept of a fair bet, and this seems to
capture the meaning that Carnap’s (b) interpretation of logical probability is intended
to capture without falling prey to subjectivism.28 But, on such an objective reading of
logical probability does OIL permit (^p & P(p)=0) to be true? It turns out that there
are many cases in which it will. Consider Olbers’ paradox in cosmology. It is logically
possible that our universe is a steady state universe, and, under certain well-known
conditions, if the universe were a steady state universe, then the sky would not be dark
at night. However, the sky is dark at night, and so the steady state theory is empirically
falsified. In such a case it is clearly possible that one might regard the steady state
universe hypothesis as logically possible, yet as having a conditional probability of 0.
But, we need not consider only cases where some theory has been refuted or falsified.
Cases of the sort withwhich one is here interestedmay also result from limited evidence.
It is logically possible that tachyons exist, but it might be the case that the hypothesis
that tachyons exist has a zero probability on the available evidence or relative to some
specified data set. Even if one accepts the requirement of total evidence, total empirical
evidence, it will can be the case that there will be logically possible hypotheses that gain
noprobabilistic support from the empirical evidence (i.e. their conditional probabilities
relative to evidence e will be zero). In fact, given the totality of empirical evidence it
appears as if it might be the case on the logical theory that no false but logically possible
theory has a non-zero probability. One might think that inductivists who adopt the
logical interpretation of probability hold that all of the evidence would exhaustively
specify all and only truths.29 Every hypothesis not supported by the totality of evidence
must have probability zero, even if it is a logically possible state of affairs. For example,
the totality of evidence may make it absolutely, and objectively, certain that electrons
do not decay (i.e. that the probability of electron decay is, in fact, zero), while it is
certainly logically possible that electron decay occurs (i.e. the totality of evidence, were
it different, may have made it certain that electron decay occurs).
27 See Hilpinen 1975.
28 Although this appears to be the intended interpretation of logical probabilities, it is not at all clear that such a
concept makes sense. The empirical nature of what constitutes rational human behavior appears to undermine the
possibility of grounding such putatively logical concepts.
29 Of course this presumes that we are talking about empirical claims, and that there really is one true description of
reality. It may turn out, if the instrumentalists are correct and induction is unwarranted, that a full specification of
the empirical facts would be compatible with several theories. This complication will be ignored here, however.
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However, typical advocates of the logical theory adopt the criterion of strict
coherence, and as one saw above, strictly coherent probability distributions are those
in which the only propositions to which zero probabilities can be assigned are those
propositions that are logically contradictory. Must the advocate of the logical
interpretation of probabilities accept the imposition of strict coherence on the
probability calculus? Again, if there are no good reasons independent reasons to do
so, then there will be no non-question begging reason why there cannot be logical
possibilities with zero probabilities. As Ramsey and others have argued coherence is
forced on us by examining the axioms of the probability calculus in light of rational
betting behavior such that one would not put oneself in a situation in which one is
guaranteed to loose in the long run. But, strict coherence is not related to the
probability calculus in the same way. Strict coherence suggests that it is merely
irrational to place oneself in a betting situation not only that is guaranteed to produce
a loss, but also that it is irrational to put oneself in a betting situation guaranteed to
make one break even and face a loss in one possible world.30 It is not clear that Dutch
book arguments can legitimately justify the adoption of strict coherence in the same
way that they can justify unrestricted coherence, as such a Dutch book argument
necessitates strengthening the probability calculus in accord with more controversial
intuitions concerning rational betting behavior. If one is attempting to justify the
probability calculus why should one require admissible probability distributions to be
strictly coherent, and, hence, require that the probability calculus be modified? Again,
as pointed out in the context of subjectivist interpretations of the probability calculus
such justifications as are available depend on intuitions and rather suspicious claims
about the analyticity of the strict coherence criterion, and this feeble justificatory
facade begs the question against those who do not share such intuitions. So, OIL does
appear to permit (^p & P(p)=0) to be true, whether it is characterized as subjective
or as objective provided there are no non-question begging justification of strict
coherence and there do not seem to be any such justification currently available.
3. Conclusion
The counter-examples presented in §2 show that the main argument given herein is
sound. Thus, (^p? P(p) „ 0) appears to be false, and so it appears to be the case that,
for conceptual reasons, possibility cannot be reduced to probability under any sort of
interpretation of the probability calculus despite the appeal that such an eliminative
reduction would have for empiricists. Consequently, it would seem that we can, at
least tentatively, conclude that it is a conceptual truth that the Venn project, tempered
modal eliminativism, is fundamentally misguided. As such, it is reasonable to believe
that the concepts of the alethic modalities are in no danger of being reduced to
probabilities, despite this deeply interesting, truly innovative and initially promising
suggestion from John Venn.31 As such, if empiricists are to lay the ghost of modality
to rest, they must seek some other more effective stratagem to do so.
30 See Shimony (1955, p. 127).
31 Curiously, the Leibnizian program of probabilistic eliminativism is also fundamentally misguided (although,
formally, it is in better shape), but that is a topic for another paper. Presuming that this is the case, however, rejection
of both the Venn project (modal eliminativism) and the Leibnizian project (probabilistic eliminativism) would show
that the concepts of probability and of the traditional modalities are simply distinct.
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